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THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEW 
STATE ACTIVISM 
Mark Side!* 
A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR (NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE AND 
SOCIETY). By Norman I. Silber. Boulder: Westview Press. 2001. 
Pp. 184. $29. 
The burgeoning field of nonprofit and philanthropic law has a new 
and superb history in Norman Silber's pathbreaking A Corporate 
Form of Freedom: The Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector. In con­
fronting "the history of efforts to control the creation and permissible 
purposes for nonprofit corporations by states, and . . .  the relocation of 
these efforts to the Internal Revenue Service" (p. 5), Professor Silber 
effectively delineates the rich history of our ambiguous, often con­
flicted attempts to regulate the American nonprofit sector, and points 
clearly to the ways in which history influences the current complexities 
of state regulation. From a discredited era of state intrusion into the 
purposes and goals of nonprofit formation, a history admirably ana­
lyzed by Silber's volume, we have now turned to an inconsistent pat­
tern of several decades of post-registration state monitoring of the 
nonprofit sector - in some jurisdictions a virtual ceding of nonprofit 
monitoring to the Internal Revenue Service, and in others a new state 
activism well worth exploring. 
The struggle to effectively balance oversight with freedom in the 
regulation of the American nonprofit sector is a key theme of Silber's 
work. This is, of course, a long-standing problem in American law. Be­
cause of continuing concerns for the efficacy of IRS oversight, limita­
tions on the right of citizens to have standing to sue upon misconduct 
by nonprofits, and a virtual absence of effective means of self­
regulation in the nonprofit sector, states - led by New York - have 
at times aggressively exercised their powers to monitor, oversee and 
regulate the nonprofit sector. At least one key state appears to be do­
ing so now. Given the failure, or at least the limitations, of other over­
sight means, it is perhaps inevitable that the states should step into this 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Research Scholar, 
Obermann Center for Advanced Studies, University of Iowa. A.B. 1979, Princeton; J.D. 
1985, Columbia. The author acknowledges support provided by the Obermann Center for 
Advanced Studies, directed by Jay Semel, and useful comments from Sandy Boyd, Pat Cain, 
Richard Koontz, and Ken Kress. - Ed. 
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fray. That new state activism is well worth exploring in its own right -
but it is also not without significant problems, inconsistencies, and 
limitations, as this Review indicates. The time has perhaps now ar­
rived to put the new state activism into an analytical framework that 
can help determine its utility in the regulation of the rapidly growing 
and now considerably more complex American nonprofit sector. 
I. THE CHECKERED HISTORY OF AMERICAN NONPROFIT 
REGULATION AND THE DISCRETIONARY TRADITION 
Today the American nonprofit sector is, in Silber's words: 
integral to the national economy and a valued part of [our] social fab­
ric . . . .  [It] embodies the philanthropic goodness, conviviality, cultural 
excitement, and democratic spirit of the American people . . . .  [and] has 
provided a valued social location in which groups can operate without 
pecuniary obsessions and with measures of success that are not necessar­
ily related to financial profitability. (p. 2) 
Yet organizations within the sector do not - perhaps should not -
coordinate activities and policies particularly effectively with each 
other; that joyous chaos may be one of the chief attributes of 
American civil society. The issues are legion: misconduct in the non­
profit sector, such as the United Way debacle of the early 1990s;1 coor­
dination and relief problems after September 11 ,  including the prob­
lems faced by the American Red Cross;2 a continuing convergence 
between nonprofit and for-profit organizational forms and goals; weak 
self-regulatory mechanisms in the sector; and many others. We have 
little in the way of direct, resource-favored supervisory power to rely 
upon even if we would wish to do so. The Internal Revenue Service 
remains an uneven regulator of the sector, and many states devote very 
few personnel or resources to nonprofit oversight.3 
1. The United Way head used more than $600,000 in United Way funds for personal 
expenses and travel. See Karen W. Arenson, Former United Way Chief Guilty in Theft of 
More Than $600,000, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at Al; Felicity Barringer, United Way Head 
is Forced Out in a Furor Over His Lavish Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at Al; see also 
United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1999). 
Useful commentaries include Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 
41 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1996); Susan Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust 
Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999); Harvey J. Goldschrnid, 
The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Pro­
posed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998). 
2. Nick Cater, Attack Response Marred by Charities' Missteps, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 29, 2001, at 37 (reviewing missteps at the Red Cross); Deborah Son­
tag, What Brought Bernardine Healy Down, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 23, 2001, at 32 (re­
viewing Red Cross post-September 11 fundraising and controversies); Grant Williams, Tur­
moil at the Red Cross, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Nov. l ,  2001, at 71 (reporting spreading 
of questions raised surrounding September 11-related issues). 
3. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 
(1998); Laura Brown Chisolm, Sinking the Think Tanks Upstream: The Use and Misuse of 
Tax Exemption Law to Address the Use and Misuse of Tax-Exempt Organizations by Politi-
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And so, at least in many states, our legal regime for the nonprofit 
sector works well in the good days and badly in the tougher times, 
when some form of closer observation might be useful. But even in the 
better days, the weak state of nonprofit regulation sparks exposes of 
nonprofit deficiencies4 and reflexive calls to tighten regulation, often 
beginning with moves to reimpose property taxation on nonprofits5 or 
to over-regulate - in Silber's words, "threaten[ing] to eliminate all of 
the important privileges for all organizations, not just the abusers" 
(p. 4; italics omitted). The evolution of nonprofit regulation is the pri­
mary topic of Professor Silber's book and may shed some light on the 
future of nonprofit oversight. 
Early in our history, state legislatures retained power over the 
American charitable sector through the power to charter nonprofit 
corporations. In the mid-nineteenth century, state legislatures "gave 
judges in some states and bureaucrats in others the primary authority 
to stand guard at the main entrance to the sector and to monitor or­
ganizational changes to existing groups" (p. 5). Much of Silber's book 
is about the judicial strand of this second period in nonprofit regula­
tion, when state legislatures ceded substantial control of gate-keeping 
and monitoring functions to judiciaries in some states and executive 
branch officials in others. This long period, from about the 1850s until 
the 1950s was marked in judge-dominant states, by a "vigorous ex­
pan[ sion ]" of judicial power, and, at least in New York, by " [holding] 
onto a discretion which became so strong that their personal reserva­
tions - religious, political, class, cultural, racial, and social - as a 
matter of legal doctrine were sufficient to sanction disapproval" (p. 5). 
Silber's volume is at its best in exposing the political, religious, racial, 
social, and cultural biases that helped to guide judicial decisions on 
nonprofit registration in New York in the late nineteenth century and 
the first half of the twentieth century. Based loosely on the statutory 
guide that judges approve only nonprofit applications with "lawful" 
purposes, judicial discretion developed through rejection of blanket 
cians, 51 U. PITI. L. REV. 577 (1990); George Rodrigue, For America's Nonprofit Sector, the 
Watchdog Seldom Barks, NIEMAN REP., Mar. 22, 1998, at 50, 56. 
4. Gilbert Gaul and Neil Borowski's series on this theme was nominated for the Pulitzer 
Prize in 1994. See GILBERT GAUL & NEIL BOROWSKI, FREE RIDE: THE TAX-EXEMPT 
ECONOMY (1993). 
5. For an earlier review of this debate, see Developments in the Law - Nonprofit Cor­
porations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1992). For more recent discussions, see Rob Atkinson, 
Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthe­
ses, 27 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1997); Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptu­
alizing the Charity Tax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998); Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflec­
tions on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J. L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 555 (1998); John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Chari­
table Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657 (2001); and Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home 
Front" for Charitable Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
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approval of charters and the cultivation of a "jurisprudence of privi­
lege which required applicants further to demonstrate that their con­
duct would be socially beneficial, from the judge's perspective" (p. 32). 
Silber traces a string of these cases, beginning with the rejection of 
Augudath Hakehiloth, a social services and mutual aid association for 
immigrants, whose application indicated that its meetings would occur 
on Sundays. "A thing may be lawful, and yet not laudable," wrote the 
trial court judge to whom the approval petition was brought under the 
New York General Laws of 1895.6 Membership meetings on Sunday 
violated "the public policy of the state, if not to [the] letter of its law."7 
In the years that followed, New York's judges expanded their inter­
pretation of the language of the 1895 Membership Corporation Law, 
which in Silber's words "explicitly required . . .  judicial approval of 
[nonprofit] certificates," and allowed judicial interpretation of the eli­
gibility requirement of "any lawful purpose" contained in the statute 
(p. 35). The judicial role would not be merely ministerial, but substan­
tive as well: 
The Legislature has prescribed simple means by which an artificial entity 
may be created, and, when created, endowed with certain powers and 
privileges. What more reasonable than that, before imparting legal life, 
there should be judicial scrutiny of those qualifications which the law 
makes essential, and not a mere perfunctory passing on what may be pre­
sented.8 
The implementation of this doctrine by New York judges took 
several forms. A white Elks organization received judicial support in 
its attempt to block the registration of a black Elks organization, os­
tensibly as a consumer protection device to avoid confusion in organ­
izational names.9 But, as Silber points out, "[c]loaking obtuseness as 
impartiality allowed the court to use the incorporation law to perpetu­
ate the social and cultural separation of the races" (p. 38). Other cases 
extended the rationales for judicial intervention, especially following 
the first World War and during the Red Scare of the 1910s and 1920s. 
Allowing a Catalonian Nationalist Club to incorporate in New York in 
1920 would not, in the words of the deciding judge, reflect "that the 
great need of the time is the teaching of American 'culture' " rather 
than the slowing of "homogeneity."10 The amended certificate of the 
Lithuanian Worker's Literature Society, which was made up of 
6. P. 32 (quoting In re Agudath Hekahiloth, 42 N.Y.S. 985, 987 (Sup. Ct. 1896)). 
7. Id. 
8. P. 36 (quoting Justice Goff in In re Wendover Athletic Ass'n, 128 N.Y.S. 561, 562 
(Sup. Ct. 1911)). 
9. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. Improved Benevolent & Protective Order 
of Elks of the World, 98 N.E. 756, 757 (N.Y. 1912). 
10. Pp. 39-40 (quoting In re Catalonian Nationalist Club, 184 N.Y.S. 132 (Sup. Ct. 
1920)). 
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Socialist Party members and sought to publish socialist materials, was 
disapproved because it would publish "propaganda, which our Penal 
Law makes criminal and even felonious."11 Judicial and executive in­
tervention sought to govern the extension of nonprofit corporations in 
certain business activities by asserting their "own role in determining 
the boundaries for nonprofit corporate activities and widen[ing] those 
boundaries to allow new opportunities for business activities, provided 
they were technically compliant with established rules."12 
Silber provides other useful examples of the perils of the discre­
tionary period as well, making a strong argument that judges and their 
biases predominated in nonprofit chartering decisions in New York 
and other states between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centu­
ries (pp. 48-81). As Silber shows at least briefly, the stereotypes and 
political views that New York judges reflected were also found in 
other state courts (p. 5). But then Silber attempts to broaden the ap­
plicability of these state court opinions: "For a considerable part of 
American history, therefore, the thought of officials about what was a 
proper role for nonprofits can be illuminated by analyzing the actions 
of common law judges in New York, Pennsylvania, and the other 
states in which reported opinions can be found" (p. 5). What of the 
other states, in which "legislatures gave . . .  bureaucrats . . .  the pri­
mary authority to stand guard at the main entrance to the sector and 
to monitor organizational changes to existing groups?" (p. 5). Did the 
bureaucrats in these states seek to expand their authority in the way 
judges did in the states of judicial rule? Were they given - or did they 
obtain - the stark levels of discretion that judges came to use in those 
states? And did any excesses of their exercise of authority contribute 
to the collapse of the system of authorizing judges and state officials, 
the resulting weakness of state authority (which persists today), and 
the "relocation of these efforts to the Internal Revenue Service" 
(p. 5)? 
If executive branch officials in other states expressed the same 
stereotypes and political views as did New York and Pennsylvania 
judges, the record provided in Silber's volume fails to prove the 
breadth of that notion. Did state-level executive branch officials judge 
nonprofit applications based on "personal reservations - religious, 
political, class, culture, racial, and social . . . .  " (p. 5)? And if they did, 
were they able, as a legal matter, to "[hold] onto a discretion . . .  so 
strong" that their biases "were sufficient to sanction disapproval" 
(p. 5)? This direction for research is clearly drawn by Silber's volume, 
11 .  Pp. 40-41 (quoting In re Lithuanian Workers' Literature Soc'y, 196 AD. 262, 267 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1921)). 
12. P. 47 (discussing the then-famous case of the Decimo Club and the business activi­
ties of its founder, Hugh B. Monjar). See Southerland v. Decimo Club, Inc., 142 A. 786 (Del. 
Ch. 1928). Silber discusses Decirno Club at length. Pp. 42-47. 
· 
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and is a fertile ground for follow-up work. Silber himself, however, 
fails to provide a clear answer to these questions.13 
This long period of official state judicial and executive dominance 
in the nonprofit chartering and monitoring process ended in the 1950s 
under scrutiny from young members of the legal community. "Assail­
ing the common law tradition, these revisionists utterly routed the dis­
cretionary tradition. Within less than a decade . . . judicial discre­
tion . . . had been recast and converted into an improper judicial 
usurpation that spurned newly cherished legal values" (p. 6). A series 
of law review notes and other articles, inspired by legal realism, led 
the way, along with cases in the civil rights arena.14 By the early 1960s, 
the discretionary tradition had been severely limited, rendering ap­
proval of new nonprofits a virtual entitlement.15 
Since the decline of the discretionary tradition, registration of 
nonprofits has become largely ministerial at the state level. This has 
placed greater emphasis on monitoring and enforcement of nonprofits, 
a task usually sited by state statute in offices of attorneys general and 
secretaries of state. Active monitoring and enforcement of nonprofits 
is rare in some states, episodic in others, and reasonably well-engaged 
in a few. Inconsistency remains the hallmark of state action, both 
across and within states. 
That this history has led to a certain awkwardness in the state 
regulation of nonprofits has long been clear. Writing in the early 
1960s, Kenneth Karst noted the relative weakness and inconsistency of 
state regulation, a legacy of a perhaps over-aggressive earlier charter­
ing enforcement and state and nonprofit ambivalence toward non­
profit regulation. Karst proposed an alternative - state charities 
commissions based loosely on an English model16 - as a response to 
13. Silber cites three states - Iowa, Massachusetts, and Mississippi - in which legisla­
tive or executive branch officials retained control over nonprofit incorporation. At least one 
Iowa case continues to stand for the fairly expansive proposition that the state non-profit 
formation statute (then Iowa Code § 504.1) conferred substantial interpretive and decision 
authority on executive branch officials rather than merely "ministerial" tasks. See Iowa v. 
All-Iowa Agric. Ass'n, 48 N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1951); Iowa v. Civic Action Comm., 28 N.W.2d 
467 (Iowa 1947) (upholding grant of non-profit charter to political organization). 
14. Chapter 4 of Silber's volume, The Corrosion of the Discretionary Conception, pp. 83-
126, discusses the downfall of the discretionary tradition in useful detail. 
15. But, of course, the judges did not give way quite so easily, as Silber also explains. 
Even into the 1970s, the judiciary was still trying to regulate the chartering process in par­
ticular cases. See pp. 130-31. 
16. For more detailed information on the supervisory role of the English Charity Com­
mission, see ELIZABETH CAIRNS, CHARITIES: LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1997), and 
James Randolph Michels, U.K. Charity Law: ls it Creating a True Democracy of Giving? 34 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 169 (2001). Martin Knapp and Jeremy Kendall provide some indi­
cation of the failure of the Commission to live up to its expectations, especially since the 
Nathan Report of 1952. Martin Knapp & Jeremy Kendall, Policy Issues for the UK Volun­
tary Sector in the 1990s, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE MIXED ECONOMY 221 (Avner 
Ben-Ner & Benedetto Gui eds., 1993). Evelyn Brody critiques the American reliance on the 
charity commission model. Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 
1318 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 100:1312 
the insufficiencies of state judicial and executive administration.17 And 
others in the intervening years have proposed alternate ways to effec­
tively monitor nonprofits and enforce state statutes governing them 
without returning to the prejudice and inconsistency of the discretion­
ary era.18 
II. BEYOND THE DISCRETIONARY TRADITION: TOWARD A NEW 
STATE ACTIVISM IN NONPROFIT MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT 
Developments since Karst's well-known article have perhaps re­
duced some of the perceived advantages of English-style charity com­
missions as a rough model for American charity regulation.19 Similarly, 
other proposed models of monitoring and enforcement failed to take 
hold, while structures of self-regulation and accountability within the 
nonprofit and philanthropic sectors remain weak. The awkward, in­
consistent nature of state regulation of the nonprofit sector remains as 
intractable a problem as when Karst and others identified it some 
thirty years ago. In removing judicial bias and moving toward the twin 
systems of federal tax regulation and state corporate and trust regula­
tion, nonprofits are often not effectively monitored or regulated by ei­
ther system, leading to contradictory patterns of under-regulation, 
over-regulation, and appropriate action, to a lack of ongoing moni­
toring, and occasionally to bursts of activity when specific issues arise. 
The migration of discretion, in Silber's useful phrase, has continued 
from the 1950s to this day.20 
Several examples indicate the complex, perhaps contradictory na­
ture of state regulation today. All come from New York, the core of 
Silber's exploration of the stages of nonprofit regulation and to this 
day a key laboratory for state-level monitoring of nonprofits. It is no 
41 VILL. L. REV. 433 (1996). For discussion of the utility of the English approach in the Ca­
nadian context, see Deborah J. Lewis, A Principled Approach to the Law of Charities in the 
Face of Analogies, Activities and the Advancement of Education, 25 QUEEN'S L.J. 679 (2000). 
17. Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Re­
sponsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960). 
18. For review and useful discussion of competing proposals, see, for example, Brody, 
supra note 16. 
19. See Brody, supra note 16; Knapp & Kendall, supra note 16. 
20. P. 136. In New York, discretion migrated from judges to administrative authorities 
responsible for approvals. Pp. 136-38. An example of the sometimes wildly erratic nature of 
state oversight of nonprofits occurs in the regulation of fundraising, as my colleague Richard 
Koontz points out, where state action ranges from the largely nonexistent to the occasionally 
intrusive. For earlier discussion, see, for example, Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality 
of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 
(1991); Ellen Harris et al., Fundraising Into the 1990s: State Regulation of Charitable Solicita­
tion After Riley, in 1 TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY 1 (1989). For a recent problem in this area, 
see Melissa G. Liazos, Can States Impose Registration Requirements on Online Charitable 
Solicitors? 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1379 (2000). 
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accident that New York is the primary laboratory for Silber's volume 
and remains a key subject for study of state monitoring of nonprofits 
today. At the executive level, the New York State Attorney General, 
empowered and obligated by law to oversee nonprofits,21 has re­
mained active in the nonprofit arena, both in formal monitoring and 
enforcement and in its less formal varieties. If New York was a pio­
neer in judicial discretion over the nonprofit registration process, it is 
perhaps not surprising that it has also been a pioneer in state re­
sponses to the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the post­
discretionary era. The New York Attorney General has, in recent dec­
ades and particularly in recent years, sought to exercise closer and 
more public oversight of the nonprofit sector in the absence of other 
realistic alternatives in the . post-discretionary era and in the midst of 
rapid growth of the sector.22 
That oversight includes regular monitoring, informal but strong 
pressure on certain nonprofits to reform or alter inappropriate prac­
tices, with the threat of judicial action looming in the background; 
formal action to intervene in certain cases; and attempts to expand the 
recognized scope of the Attorney General's jurisdiction into new ar­
eas. In some cases it has been effective, in some cases highly problem­
atic. 
21. In New York, the role of the Attorney General is stipulated in the New York Not­
For-Profit Corporation Law and the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, among 
other statutes. For the New York Attorney General's position on these powers, as well as an 
extensive review of Attorney General power under specific sections of each statute, see 
Nathan M. Courtney & James G. Siegal, The Regulatory Role of the Attorney General's 
Charities Bureau, at www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/role.html [hereinafter The Regulatory 
Role]. 
22. The New York State Attorney General has statutory authority to oversee and regu­
late the nonprofit sector under the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, including 
authority over a wide range of nonprofit corporate changes. See The Regulatory Role, supra 
note 21,  at 1 .  The Attorney General's office also claims that " [t]he Attorney General's su­
pervisory authority over charities is rooted in the common law of charitable trusts and cor­
porations, as well as the parens patriae power of the state to protect the interest of the public 
in assets pledged to public purposes." Id. 
The Attorney General's authority to oversee the administration of charitable assets in 
New York State, "representing the interests of beneficiaries of charitable dispositions and 
enforcing laws governing the conduct of fiduciaries of·charitable estates," is also derived 
from the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law. Id. According to the Attorney General, 
its roles in the oversight of conduct of fiduciaries of charitable assets include "broad statu­
tory authority to prosecute and defend legal actions to protect the interests of the State and 
the public" under the New York State Executive Law, authority under the Estates, Powers 
and Trusts Law to "investigate transactions and relationships of trustees for the purpose of 
determining whether or not property held for charitable purposes has been and is being 
properly administered" (EPTL § 8-1.4(i)), the power to issue subpoenas and the EPTL and 
the Executive Law, and the power to "institute appropriate proceedings to secure compli­
ance with this section and to secure the proper administration of any trust, corporation, or 
other relationship to which this section applies" (EPTL § 8-1 .4(m)). Id. at 2. 
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III. THE AMBIGUOUS RESURGENCE OF OVERSIGHT: WALLACE­
READER'S DIGEST AND THE INFORMAL USES OF STATE POWER 
The New York dispute over the disposition of controlled gifts from 
the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds is a modern illustration of the im­
portant but occasionally less formal role of state regulatory authorities 
in the nonprofit arena. The Wallace-Reader's Digest dispute arose out 
of the special context of earlier gifts by the Wallace family to thirteen 
elite cultural, environmental, and academic institutions close to the 
philanthropic interest of the founders of Reader's Digest, DeWitt and 
Lila Wallace, and their advisors.23 In the 1980s, before DeWitt and 
Lila Wallace died, they made substantial bequests to those thirteen 
organizations in a complex and unusual form.24 
The bequests stipulated that the donated funds would be managed 
by seven "supporting organizations" rather than by the beneficiaries 
themselves. The "supporting organizations" were largely controlled by 
the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and Reader's Digest and . the as­
sets of the seven supporting organizations were substantially invested 
in Reader's Digest stock. This caused a rift between Wallace-Reader's 
Digest and the institutional beneficiaries. As the New York Times ex­
plained, 
[t]he endowment funds, heavily invested in Reader's Digest stock, were 
administered for the recipients by seven organizations under restrictions 
that impeded the selling of Digest stock. The [value of the Reader's Di­
gest] shares plummeted in the 1990's as the stock market took off, but 
the arrangement buttressed the Reader's Digest at a turbulent time. The 
recipient groups, however, could only watch as they missed better in­
vestment opportunities.25 
23. Specifically, the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds beneficiaries were the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, the Open Space Institute, Scenic 
Hudson, the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, the Metropolitan Opera, the 
New York City Ballet, the Vivian Beaumont Theater, the New York City Opera, the 
Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York, the Chamber Music Society of New York, 
Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, and the Wildlife Conservation Society in New 
York. 
24. The Wallace-Reader's Digest dispute is discussed in Ralph Blumenthal, 13 Institu­
tions Obtain Control of Vast Bequest, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001,  at Al. For an account of a 
senior attorney in the Attorney General's office discussing the Wallace-Reader's Digest dis­
pute, see William Josephson, Guiding Practioners and Fiduciaries on Charities, N.Y.L.J., 
Dec. 3, 2001, at 1 .  See also Janet L. Fix, Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and N. Y. Attorney 
General Reach Settlement, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 17, 2001, at 13. For an earlier 
treatment focusing on the shareholder dissatisfaction with the declining price of Reader's 
Digest stock, see Geraldine Fabrikant, Faith Ebbs on Reader's Digest Stock, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. '16, 1998, at Dl, and Geraldine Fabrikant, Reader's Digest Gives the Arts a Lesson in 
Finance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at Al. Dueling statements by the Wallace-Reader's Di­
gest Funds and by the New York Attorney General are cited infra notes 30-31 .  
25. See Blumenthal, supra note 24. 
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According to statistics compiled by the New York Times, a number 
of the beneficiaries lost money on the portion of the Wallace bequest 
that was controlled by the intermediate "supporting organizations." 
But the cultural institutions profited on the portion of the Wallace be­
quest that they themselves controlled and diversified. At the end of 
fiscal year 1997, for example, the Metropolitan Museum of Art's total 
share of the Wallace bequest was $370.2 million. Of that, $196.3 mil­
lion was controlled by a Digest supporting organization and held in 
Digest stock, and that portion of the portfolio had declined in value by 
17% since the end of 1991. The other $173.9 million of the bequest ­
including dividends on the Digest stock - was controlled directly by 
the Museum and invested in a more diversified manner; in that six­
year period it appreciated 47.8%.  Lincoln Center's26 experience was 
similar: in the same time period it lost 17% on the portion of the port­
folio controlled by a Digest supporting organization and held in Digest 
stock, and gained 23.9% on the portion of the gift that it controlled.27 
The New York State Attorney General's office joined this complex 
and confusing fray in 1998, when it learned that some of the ultimate 
institutional beneficiaries (most of whom were based in New York 
State) were concerned that the Digest-influenced supporting organiza­
tions had declined to diversify holdings away from weak Digest stock 
despite some institutions' desire to diversify. The Attorney General's 
office was concerned primarily about potential conflicts of interest in 
the decisionmaking involving supporting organizations that were 
heavily influenced by the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds and the 
management of Reader's Digest, because under New York law chari­
table fiduciaries are required to administer charitable funds for the 
benefit of recipients rather than for other purposes. One corporate 
watchdog and Digest investor put the problem in fairly blunt terms: 
[M]y concerns were [that] there were tremendous conflicts of interest in­
herent in the foundation [Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds] and the com­
pany [Reader's Digest]. The company was making decisions for the 
benefit of the foundation and the foundation was making decisions for 
26. The Lincoln Center organizations included in the Wallace-Readers Digest settle­
ment included the Metropolitan Opera (receiving approximately $92 million); New York 
City Ballet ($65 million); Vivian Beaumont Theater ($59 million); New York City Opera 
($59 million); Philharmonic Symphony Society of New York ($26 million); and the Chamber 
Music Society of New York ($13 million). Ralph Blumenthal, Institutions Finally Gain Con­
trol of Large Reader's Digest Bequest, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2001, at Al. 
27. Of the seven organizations profiled by the New York Times, only one appeared to 
have lost money both on the portfolio controlled by a Digest supporting organization and 
held in Digest stock, and on the portfolio (including Digest stock dividends) that it con­
trolled itself. That was Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, which lost 51 .2% in the 
1991-1997 timeframe on the Digest-controlled portfolio and lost 16.1 % on the portfolio it 
controlled. Id. 
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the benefit of the company and no one was making decisions for the 
benefit of the outside shareholders.28 
The Attorney General appears to have strongly but informally 
urged the parties to come to a settlement and reportedly threatened 
subpoenas and a lawsuit.29 That pressure seems to have had the same 
effect. The Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds announced in May 2001 
that $1.7 billion would be transferred from control of the supporting 
organizations to control by the thirteen ultimate institutional benefici­
aries, the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the others.30 The shift was 
announced not as a written agreement between the New York State 
Attorney General and the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds, but in 
separate press releases from each party, and press reports in which the 
two sides issued overlapping but not equivalent - and not particularly 
friendly - comments.31 The New York Attorney General's statement 
emphasized the shift as an "agreement" between the Funds and the 
Attorney General's office that "resolv[ed] concerns expressed by [At­
torney General] Spitzer's office. "32 The Attorney General announced 
"an historic agreement" in which 
upon the recommendation of the Wallace-Reader's Digest Funds, the 
[seven Wallace] Supporting Organizations [established to benefit the 
thirteen institutional recipients] will be dissolved and all of their assets, 
which include both Reader's Digest stock and other, diversified holdings, 
will be transferred to the 13 charities so that they will now be able to di­
rectly manage their own assets in a manner consistent with the wishes of 
28. Blumenthal, supra note 26. 
29. See id.; Ann Marie Chaker, Reader's Digest Funds Revamp, Give Control of Assets 
to Charities, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2001, at B4; Katia Hetter, Reader's Digest Deal Benefits 
Groups, NEWSDA Y, May 4, 2001, at A59. 
30. The Reader's Digest statement, Wallace Funds Transfer $1.7 Billion to 13 Charitable 
Institutions, can be found at http://www.wallacefunds.org/newsroom. The Metropolitan Mu­
seum of Art received $424 million, Macalester College $303 million, the Wildlife Conserva­
tion Society $191 million, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation $155 million, the Open Space 
Institute $115 million, Scenic Hudson Inc. $115 million, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer 
Center $100 million, Metropolitan Opera Association $92 million, New York City Ballet $65 
million, Vivian Beaumont Theater $59 million, New York City Opera $59 million, Philhar­
monic Symphony Society of New York $26 million, and the Chamber Music Society of New 
York $13 million. The agreements stipulated that each recipient would "place these assets in 
a newly-created endowment fund named for the Wallaces. Income from the endowments 
will be devoted to projects consistent with the wishes of the founding donors and the histori­
cal practices of the supporting organizations." Id. 
31. For the Attorney General's statement, see Spitzer Announces Resolution Involving 
$3.2 Billion Legacy Left by Founders of Reader's Digest; 13 Major Charities Including the 
Met, Sloan-Kettering, Colonial Williamsburg, Will Now Control Own Funds; Reorganiza­
tion Also Includes New, Independent Board for Wallace-Reader's Digest Foundation 
[hereinafter New York Attorney General May 4 statement], at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ 
press/2001/may/may04a_Ol.html. 
32. New York Attorney General May 4 statement, supra note 31 .  
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the Wallaces and the historical practices of the Wallace Supporting Or­
ganizations.33 
The Attorney General's concerns had gone beyond control over a 
charitable beneficiary's invested funds to a concern for Reader's 
Digest's control over the investments and practices of the Wallace­
Reader's Digest Funds. The Attorney General thus also announced 
that "the Wallace Funds, which hold a 50% share of Reader's Digest 
voting stock, have taken steps to modernize their governing structure, 
resolving concerns expressed by Spitzer's office. The new corporate 
structure, implemented by the foundations two months ago, is de­
signed to ensure fully independent decision making, particularly when 
it comes to investment decisions."34 Attorney General Spitzer empha­
sized that "these steps will help ensure the long-term health and vi­
ability of the Wallaces' bequest and benefit the arts, cultural, medical, 
environmental and historic preservation communities for generations 
to come," closing with a swipe at the practices of the Wallace Funds 
and the supporting organizations: "This divestiture by the Supporting 
Organizations moves the Wallaces' bequest into the 21st century with 
a sound investment strategy."35 
Wallace-Reader's Digest may have resisted pressure to transfer 
control over the bequests to the recipient groups and may have re­
sisted criticism of the interlocking structure of the company, Funds, 
and supporting organizations. Likewise it appears that the pressure 
applied by two New York Attorneys General - first Dennis Vacco, 
then Eliot Spitzer - played a substantial role in urging Wallace­
Reader's Digest to bend on both counts. The Attorney General's in­
quiry and pressure was apparently central to accelerating the negotia­
tions that took place, and to the settlement that resulted. And, in this 
case, an informal process seems to have produced the right result in 
philanthropic terms. But it is also clear that these informal, pressuring 
processes were the only means to resolve an increasingly knotty 
problem of conflicted interests and philanthropic capital short of for-
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. Comments by the recipient groups - some of which had complained earlier of 
investment and Reader's Digest stock sale restrictions - were considerably more muted, as 
the recipients tried to antagonize neither the Wallace Funds nor the Attorney General. The 
President of the Metropolitan Museum allowed the Attorney General's office to issue a 
bland statement that " [a)lthough this agreement provides no new funding to the Metropoli­
tan, it does give it the ability to directly oversee this investment. In this way, the institution 
will continue to carry Lila Acheson Wallace's legacy into the future." Id. The executive di­
rector of Scenic Hudson was quoted by the Attorney General's office as saying: 
Id. 
This is great news for Scenic Hudson. It puts us on a firm foundation for the new century 
and helps ensure the stability of our land-preservation work. The fact that we have been en­
trusted to manage these resources should give us increased credibility with our funders, 
whose help we need more than ever. 
1324 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 100:1312 
mal litigation. The informal processes went forward in an environment 
in which the philanthropic community itself did not have structures of 
self-regulation and accountability in place to resolve such issues before 
a regulatory authority became involved in its informal capacities, 
threatening more formal action. 
IV. THE AMBIGUOUS EXTENSION OF OVERSIGHT: NEW YORK 
COMMUNITY TRUST AND THE FAILED EXPANSION OF STATE POWER 
By the 1990s a new form of philanthropy was expanding rapidly 
throughout the United States. Community foundations - pools of 
funds donated by, in most cases, local philanthropists, had begun to 
remake the American philanthropic landscape and to remake tradi­
tional relationships between individual donors and charitable causes. 
By 2000 there were over 500 community foundations and funds in the 
United States with assets of over $27 billion � more than double the 
$12 billion in assets reported as recently as 1995. Philanthropic dona­
tions by American community foundations have quadrupled since 
1990.36 
Community foundations have built their growth on the logical as­
sumption that pooling philanthropic funds and using those pooled 
funds in a focused way on local problems may have a faster and 
deeper impact on local social issues. This concept has enabled com­
munity foundations to attract funds through direct donations, without 
restriction on the application of those funds to local charitable, educa­
tional, and other causes. While that form of giving is warmly wel­
comed by community foundations because it allows the foundations 
maximum flexibility in grantmaking, many philanthropists restrict the 
use of their funds to specific organizations, causes, or fields, desiring 
the administrative convenience, investment management, and philan­
thropic focus of donating through community foundations but wanting 
a continuing role in determining where and how their philanthropic 
dollars will be distributed. Donors that restrict the use of their funds 
know that a significant feature of community foundations - the key 
innovation when community foundations were introduced by attorney 
Frederick Goff in 1913 in Cleveland - will protect the utility of their 
philanthropy as social needs change. That is the "variance power," 
under which donors and community foundations agree that the foun­
dation may redirect a donor's chosen philanthropy if the original re­
striction or request is made redundant or impossible due to the pas­
sage of time.37 In 1971, the New York Community Trust exercised that 
36. The Foundation Center, Foundation Growth and Giving Estimates 2001, at 
http://www.fdncenter.org/research. 
37. The variance power of community foundations has often been analogized to cy pres, 
the power of a court to order a change in purpose in a charitable trust or other instrument. 
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variance power with respect to six trusts created decades earlier, di­
recting grants away from a major New York social service organiza­
tion, the Community Service Society, and toward more flexible grant­
making. The Community Service Society's challenge of that action in 
the 1990s marked the first significant judicial challenge to the use of 
the variance power by community foundations, and brought the New 
York Attorney General into the fray.38 
In the 1940s, Laura Spelman Rockefeller and other committed 
New York philanthropists made bequests to the New York Commu­
nity Trust for the benefit of the Community Service Society, a private, 
charitable New York agency that has served the city's poor since the 
mid-nineteenth century. When Rockefeller and the others made their 
bequests, they and the New York Community Trust signed a trust 
resolution which provided that the Community Trust would deliver 
the income from the invested bequests to the Community Service 
Society, but that the Community Trust might also vary the disposition 
of her bequest from her specific intention. In the words of the trust 
resolution, 
any such expressed desire of the donor shall be respected and observed, 
subject, however, in every case to the condition that if and whenever it 
shall appear to the Distribution Committee [of the Community Trust] . . .  
that circumstances have so changed since the execution of the instrument 
containing any gift, grant, devise or bequest as to render unnecessary, 
undesirable, impractical or impossible a literal compliance with the terms 
of such instrument, such Committee may at any time or from time to 
time direct the application of such gift, grant, devise or bequest to such 
other public educational, charitable or benevolent purpose as, in their 
judgment, will most effectually accomplish the general purpose . . .  with­
out regard to and free from any specific restriction limitation or direction 
contained in such instrument.39 
Variance power can be understood as a contractual form of cy pres that obviates the need 
for judicial involvement in acquiescing to and determining a changed or new charitable pur­
pose, and that eliminates the long-standing doctrinal complexities and inflexibilities of cy 
pres. On cy pres, see Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1 111  
(1993); Edith Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine and Changing Philosophies, 51 MICH. L .  REV. 375 
(1953); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding 
the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 HAW. L. REV. 353 (1999); Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross 
D. Taylor, Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational 
Contracts and Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. 
REV. 545 (1989); Roger G. Sisson, Relaxing the Dead Hand's Grip: Charitable Efficiency and 
the Doctrine of Cy Pres, 74 VA. L. REV. 635 (1988). 
38. Cmty. Serv. Soc'y v. N.Y. Cmty. Trust (In re Preiskel), 275 A.D.2d 171 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2000), motion for leave to appeal denied, 751 N.E.2d 940 (N.Y. 2001). This case is de­
scribed in some detail below given its significance for the regulation of community philan­
thropy in the United States, and for the future role of state attorneys-general and other state 
executive authorities in monitoring and reviewing the "variance power" decisions of com­
munity foundations and trusts. 
39. Id. at 174. 
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For several decades, until the early 1970s, this process worked 
smoothly. Monies from the Laura Spelman Memorial and the other 
designated trusts were invested by the New York Community Trust, 
and on a regular basis income from the invested assets of the desig­
nated funds were directed to the Community Service Society in sup­
port of its social programs. The situation changed drastically in 1970, 
when the Community Trust initiated a review of its funding proce­
dures and priorities. The Community Service Society claims that the 
Community Trust initiated this review, in the words of the appellate 
court, "to eliminate as much as possible the designated funds and ex­
pand Community Trust's discretion with regard to the distribution of 
funds. "40 The Community Trust rejected that explanation of its moti­
vations, claiming that "the impetus for the review was the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, which made clear that charitable foundations where the 
donors exercised inordinate control over the distribution of monies 
ran the risk of losing tax-exempt status."41 
The Community Trust's review of its grants to the Community 
Service Society also coincided with a program and organizational re­
view by the Community Service Society of its own activities. Deeply 
affected by the social movements of the late 1960s, the Community 
Service Society 
change[d] how services were provided. Instead of requiring individuals in 
need of assistance to make an appointment to come to one of its four of­
fices, it was decided to move operations into community groups . . .  such 
as transient hotels, hospital and housing projects . . . .  [A]ssistance would 
no longer always be directly provided by [the Community Service Soci­
ety,] but could be channeled through existing community-based organi­
zations.42 
In the words of the New York appellate court, "CSS was to be trans­
formed from a social services agency to one sharing power with com­
munity-based organizations. "43 
As a result of the Community Trust's internal review of its own 
grantmaking policies, a New York Times article on the changes un­
derway at Community Service Society, and the Society's own internal 
review,44 in March 1971 the Community Trust suspended further pay-
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 175. 
43. Id. In the early 1970s, traditional New York philanthropy was not yet accustomed to 
working with community-based organizations, especially those working to support 
empowerment as well as direct services, although it is not altogether clear to what extent this 
factor played a role in Community Trust's decision to suspend automatic grant payments to 
the Society. Id. at 175-76. 
44. The appellate court appears to have believed that the Community Trust's suspen­
sion of grants to CSS was based on an article in the New York Times, describing the pro­
posed changes at CSS as a "Copernican revolution." When the key Community Trust em-
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ments to CSS and in September 1971 formally exercised its variance 
power to revoke the designated grants program of the six original 
trusts at a meeting of its Distribution Committee, and altered them to 
become " 'semi-designated fund[ s] for the improvement of health and 
welfare in New York City.' "45 Automatic grantmaking to Community 
Service Society ended, though some discretionary grants were still 
made until at least 1995.46 
In 1995, Community Service Society filed suit, seeking to compel 
an accounting of funds invested and distributed from the six trusts be­
tween 1928 and 1995, and directing distribution of income from the 
designated funds. The case came before the New York Surrogate, Eve 
Preminger, who ruled that the Community Trust had abused its vari­
ance power. The Surrogate directed an accounting for the period from 
1989 to 1999 calculating New York's six year statute of limitations for 
trust accounts from 1995, when the suit was filed. The Surrogate con­
cluded with one of the few tests that courts have ever delineated to 
guide the exercise of a foundation's variance power over designated 
trust funds. A finding of "undesirability" within the meaning of the 
Community Trust's trust resolution sufficient to allow the Trust to 
vary the terms of the bequestor " 'must be grounded in a change of 
circumstance that negatively affects the designated charity to such a 
degree that it would be likely to prompt a donor of the fund to re­
direct it. ' "47 Exercise of the variance power will be upheld only where 
"identifiable negative details" provide evidence of "undesirability" in 
carrying out the original trust instructions. The actions of a trust in 
utilizing the variance power will be judged against an "abuse of discre­
tion" standard, arid if a trust utilizes that criterion and standard, "the 
courts must afford its decision maximum deference in review."48 
Since Community Trust's notice of its changing policies to the 
Society "fell short of conveying to CSS notice of a complete termina­
tion of its interests . . . .  muddl[ing] the message of an otherwise clear 
ployee reviewed the CSS study and prepared a report in April 1971, several weeks after the 
Trust's Distribution Committee had decided to suspend grants to CSS, she wrote that 
" '[f]rom this document [the CSS study] it appears unlikely that we could continue to make 
grants to CSS based on its direct service to individuals. But, if these funds were discretionary 
rather than designated, we would most likely make grants to CSS based on its excellent pro­
gram and projects.' " Id. at 176. (emphasis omitted). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 177-78. The Community Trust claimed that the decision to exercise its variance 
power in September 1971 had been clearly communicated at the time to the Society's Execu­
tive Director and Board Chair; CSS denied that such communication had taken place, indi­
cating that it believed, until it was alerted to the contrary by Chemical Bank in 1993, that the 
grants it had received in the intervening twenty-two years had come from the automatic pro­
visions of the six original trusts. 
47. Id. at 179. 
48. Id. at 179-80. 
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repudiation . . .  there was no effective repudiation"49 and the six year 
statute of limitations for trust accountings in New York - which 
would have barred the Society's 1995 suit - did not begin to run when 
the change in funding took place in 1971. Instead, the statute of limita­
tions began to run in 1995, when the action was commenced, and thus 
the six years prior to the commencement of the proceedings were in­
cludable in the accounting ordered.50 The parties cross-appealed and 
the New York Attorney General joined the case, arguing that a com­
munity foundation should be required to provide notice to a state ex­
ecutive authority, in this case the Attorney General, when a charitable 
trust exercises its variance power.51 
The Appellate Court agreed with the Surrogate that the New York 
Community Trust had abused its variance power to alter the six trusts 
from designated funds in favor of the Community Service Society to 
more flexible grantmaking. The Court reiterated that the trusts clearly 
"intended that CSS receive specific distributions," and rejected the 
Community Trust's claim that a change in circumstances and the pol­
icy directions at the Community Service Society made the trust desig­
nation "undesirable" under the terms of the wills. 
Community Trust, arguably unhappy with mandated allocations, claims 
that the change in CSS's approach from being a direct provider to one af­
filiated with community organizations was an "undesirable" change in 
circumstances. That distinction . . .  appears . . .  virtually meaningless, 
since there is no claim that CSS has retreated from its overriding purpose 
of servicing the need. As a result, the Surrogate reasonably found that 
Community Trust abused its discretion, since there is no showing that 
CSS has deviated from its primary purpose.52 
49. Id. at 179. 
50. Id. 
51 .  The Attorney General also argued against the application of the six year statute of 
limitations period for trust accountings. Brief of Cross-Appellant New York State Attorney 
General at 44, In re Laura Spelman Rockefeller Mem'l, 2000 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 2756 
(M-269} [hereinafter Attorney General Brief] (on file with author). 
52. N. Y. Crnty. Trust, 275 A.D.2d at 182. The Appellate Court upheld the Surrogate's 
decision that community foundations must make a "finding" before utilizing the variance 
power, and that the actions of a trust in exercising the power must be judged against an 
"abuse of discretion" standard, and affirmed the Surrogate's use of each standard. The 
Court also upheld the Surrogate's substantive standard for judging the exercise of variance 
powers in "undesirability" cases, restating the restrictiveness of the test, arguably in even 
stronger and broader terms favoring the designated charities, for future cases. 
The Surrogate's conclusion, that exercise of the variance power should be limited to those 
situations where "identifiable negative details" may be offered to substantiate the "undesir­
ability" of continued payments, appears to be an equitable and definable standard. Thus, in 
a given case, if it were shown that the designated charity, for whatever reason, was no longer 
carrying out its stated purpose, then a finding of undesirability might be made. Here, how­
ever, while designated funding of community-based approaches might be undesirable from 
the Trust's viewpoint, it cannot be said that such an approach compromises the intention of 
the trust creators, which is the determinative factor. 
Id. at 182-83. 
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Thus on the question of appropriate use of the variance power, the 
appellate court found, with the Surrogate, that the Community Trust 
had misused the variance power in transforming the six trusts from 
designated funds to flexible grantmaking sources. But the appellate 
court also disagreed with the Surrogate's finding that the Community 
Trust's repudiation was not absolute, thus that the six year New York 
statute of limitations had not begun to run in 1971.  Citing the record 
of contacts between the Community Trust and the Society, the under­
standings of the Society's then General Director, and a history of over 
twenty years of grant applications after 1971, the appellate court found 
that clear repudiation had been conveyed from the Community Trust 
to the Society. Having ruled that repudiation was effective in 1971, the 
New York State six year statute of limitations began to run at that 
time, time-barring the action initiated in 1995.53 
· 
The Attorney General's intervention in the dispute, as counsel for 
the "ultimate charitable beneficiaries" of the action, was perhaps the 
least noticed element in a case that has significant ramifications for 
American community philanthropy. The Attorney General argued 
that the Court "should impose an affirmative requirement for effective 
notice to the Attorney General, to ensure that the basic fairness in­
herent in judicial proceedings is not absent from the unilateral vari­
ance power's extrajudicial alternative,''54 citing its inherent powers un­
der New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law and the Not-for­
Profit Corporation Law. The Appellate Division rather curtly declined 
to expand the Attorney General's powers in that fashion: 
In this case . . .  Community Trust explicitly possessed the variance power 
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Resolution. While nothing prevented 
it from notifying the Attorney General, there is no requirement at law to 
do so. Furthermore, while unnamed individuals might ultimately be the 
beneficiaries of the funds channeled to CSS by Community Trust, the 
fact remains that the designated recipient under the trusts at issue was 
CSS, to which Community Trust gave notice. In the absence of a specific 
requirement, this Court declines to impose one . . . .  The Attorney Gen­
eral's request that this Court craft a notice requirement would be better 
directed to the Legislature.55 
Here, too, was a vacuum that a new form of state activism was 
seeking to fill, in this case through judicial means. If a community 
foundation or trust is to exercise its "variance power,'' and if its notice 
to the original beneficiary is ambiguous, as arguably occurred in New 
53. A broad statement seemed to apply both to the pre-1995 and the post-1995 claims: 
"[A)ll of [the Society's) claims are time-barred, since there does not appear to be any reason 
to distinguish between the more recent claims, and those in the prior years. Either CSS had 
notice of the repudiation or it did not. Since it clearly did, its claims . . .  should be dismissed." 
Id. at 185. 
54. Attorney General Brief, supra note 51, at 28. · 
55. N. Y. Cmty. Trust, 275 A.D.2d at 186. 
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York Community Trust, then the Attorney General should at least 
have the opportunity to be put on notice and monitor the variance ex­
ercise. Here, too, the Attorney General steps in to craft a role because 
there appears - without litigation as in New York Community Trust 
- to be no other effective way to monitor such activities. In effect the 
New York judiciary rebuffs the Attorney General's attempt to fashion 
a regulatory role in what is, at root, a contractual relationship, viewing 
judicial processes as sufficient guard against improper action and in­
viting the Attorney General to approach the legislature if it disagrees. 
In addition to these recent examples, the New York Attorney 
General has undertaken other · highly prominent activity to monitor 
nonprofits and enforce New York's nonprofit corporation and trusts 
law. The Attorney General played a central role in exposing alleged 
malfeasance at Hale House, a child relief center that has been one of 
New York's most prominent charities.56 The Attorney General was ac­
tively involved in investigations and attempts to decertify the fund­
raising and spending activities of a Muslim charity, the Holy Land 
Foundation for Relief and Development, on the grounds that the or­
ganization had ties to Hamas, undertaken well before the federal gov­
ernment banned some of the group's banking activities after the tragic 
events of September 11 ,  2001.57 
56. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Overlooked Dire Signs at Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
2002, at Bl;  Terry Pristin, Facing Scrutiny, President of Hale House Will Resign, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 8, 2001, at B3. 
57. In early June 2001, the Attorney General initiated proceedings in state Supreme 
Court to compel the Foundation to disclose its fundraising techniques, donors, recipients of 
Foundation funds, and any pending lawsuits against the Foundation. See Muslim Fund In­
quiry is Pressed, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at A19; Spitzer Seeks Data on Mideast Charity, 
NEWSDAY, June 1, 2001, at A52. Spitzer's office said that the Foundation had ignored a Sep­
tember 2000 subpoena that requested documents on fundraising and federal tax filings. See 
id. 
The U.S. Justice and State Departments launched investigations of the Holy Land 
Foundation in the mid-1990s, focusing on alleged ties between the Foundation and Hamas, 
and leading to pre-September 11 discussions of placing the Holy Land Foundation on a list 
of terrorist organizations under a 1995 Presidential executive order requiring the Treasury 
Department, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"), to seize organiza­
tional and institutional assets that are determined to pose a threat to the peace process in the 
Middle East. See, e.g. , Richardson-based Foundation Has Been Subject of 4-Year Inquiry, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 13, 2000, at lA. Israel closed the Holy Land Foundation's 
Israel operations in May 1997 (along with four other charities), declaring it to be a front for 
Hamas. In August 2000, the State Department requested that the U.S. Agency for Interna­
tional Development ("USAID") withdraw the Foundation's listing on a roster of charities 
and relief organizations eligible for USAID funding for relief work abroad, and USAID in 
turn asked the State Department for evidence of the Foundation's links to Hamas. See 
Bob Mahlburg & Bechetta Jackson, Area Muslims Defend Charity Group, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 26, 2000, at lOB; Judith Miller, U.S. Contends Muslim Charity Is 
Tied to Hamas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2000, at A21; Muslim Charity Tied to Terrorists, U.S. 
Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 2000. 
American Airlines and Citigroup, among other U.S. firms, were asked before September 
11 to cut or reduce business ties with the Holy Land Foundation. See Janine Zacharia, 
Hamas denies it receives money via Citibank, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 26 2001, at A6. The 
Foundation raised about $6.6 million in 1999, and describes its work at http://www.hlf.org. 
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The Attorney General also played an active role in the now well­
known dispute involving trustees and the president of Adelphi 
University, in which the trustees were removed for neglect of fiduciary 
obligations in approving excessive compensation for its then­
President, with the Attorney General's office seeking to establish 
"causes of action against the former president for breach of fiduciary 
duty and against the university's trustees for [state-paid] legal fees."58 
The Attorney General's office also played an active role in state-level 
enforcement of corporate reforms at the United Way following allega­
tions of "misappropriation and mismanagement of charitable funds" 
in the early 1990s, and in suing several United Way officers for losses 
suffered as a result of the misappropriated funds.59 
The new state activism in nonprofit monitoring, at least in New 
York, has extended beyond these cases and well beyond the judicial 
arena as well. Attorney General Spitzer and his staff have publicly ad­
vised New York nonprofits on the use of investment profits from non­
profit endowments, warning nonprofits that "endowment fund appre­
ciation cannot be expended unless the governing board appropriates 
the appreciation prudently,"60 relying on the New York Not-for-Profit 
Corporation Law, and advised governing boards to hold full delibera­
tions and votes on the appropriation of endowment appreciation 
rather than devolving those decisions entirely to nonprofit executives 
or family members.61 The Attorney General's office issues annual re­
ports on the activities of fundraisers registered in New York State,62 
has published guidelines for directors of nonprofit boards and instruc­
tions for nonprofits conducting raffles in New Y ork,63 and warned on 
quorum requirements for religious corporations undertaking transac­
tions in real property,64 among other actions . .  
After the September 1 1  attacks, the Holy Land Foundation was added to the OF AC pro­
scribed list. 
58. Vacco v. Diarnandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1998), discussed in The 
Regulatory Role, supra note 21, at 5. 
59. See Former Corporate Officers Are Liable for Misappropriating Charity Money, 
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 7, 1998, at 21 (reporting decision in Vacco v. Ararnony, discussed in The 
Regulatory Role, supra note 21, at 5-6). 
60. News from the Charities Bureau: New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Ad­
vises Not-For-Profit Corporations on the Appropriation of Endowment Fund Appreciation, at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/news/endowrnent.htrnl. 
61. Id. 
62. Pennies for Charities: The Attorney General's Report on Fund Raisers in New York, 
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/charities.htrnl. 
63. Information for Charitable Organizations Conducting Raffles in New York State, at 
http://www. oag.sta te.ny. us/ charities/news/broch ure-2-28-01.h tinl. 
64. Charities Bureau Update: Quorum Requirement for Religious Corporations in Real 
Property Transactions, at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/news/quorurn.htrnl. 
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While Wallace-Reader's Digest and New York Community Trust 
were finally resolved after A Corporate Form of Freedom went to 
press, many of the themes that emerge in those disputes are mirrored 
in Silber's interpretation of the post-discretionary problems of non­
profit monitoring and enforcement. If " [t]he substitute that the stu­
dent law review commentators offered to diminish scrutiny of non­
profit purposes was a more aggressive and ongoing scrutiny after 
nonprofit associations became corporate" (marked by mandatory dis­
closure and enhanced state enforcement and federal tax scrutiny), 
"[n]one of these turned out to be sufficiently effective."65 And into 
that partial vacuum, at least in New York, bolstered by substantial 
statutory oversight authority, has moved the Attorney General, ex­
panding his scrutiny to include both informal but powerful attempts to 
bring philanthropies to heel in the Wallace-Reader's Digest episode, 
and an attempt to extend its statutory range into new areas, as in the 
notification and review of the exercise of the variance power. 
Attempts to migrate oversight, monitoring and enforcement are 
arguably undertaken with even more vigor in times of crisis, when the 
traditional patterns of oversight and coordination appear particularly 
weak. This occurred after September 2001, when dozens of philan­
thropic and charitable organizations sought to provide assistance to 
the direct and indirect victims, individuals and organizations, of the at­
tacks on the World Trade Center. As hundreds of millions of dollars in 
aid became available, but implementation appeared to begin in a 
chaotic fashion, the New York Attorney General stepped in to claim a 
role in the coordination of that assistance.66 Eventually a data bank of 
victims and available aid emerged in which the Attorney General has 
a significant role,67 and the Attorney General has played a prominent 
role in providing commentary on the September attacks.68 
There appears to be no end to this ongoing struggle for discretion 
and authority, especially when nonprofits are increasingly in the news 
and when states and citizens appear increasingly concerned that the 
oversight of nonprofits has fallen through regulatory cracks. The new 
state activism as typified by the New York disputes seems inevitable 
65. P. 146. Silber outlines the failures of mandatory disclosure and enhanced state en­
forcement and federal tax scrutiny. Pp. 146-59. 
66. See, e.g., David Barstow, $850 Million for Charity, Not Centrally Monitored, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11,  2001, at Bl; Spending ls the Hard Part, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001 , at A26. 
67. See A Fair Shake for Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,. 2001, § 4, at 8; Collaborative 
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al8. 
68. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Victims' Fund Likely to Pay Average of 
$1.6 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at Al; Testimony of New York State 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer before the House Committee on Energy and Com­
merce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Nov. 6, 2001, at 
http://www.oag.stat.ny.us/press/statements/reliefnovll.html. The Attorney General's com­
ments on the federal fund are available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/wtd. 
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given the growth in size and complexity of the sector, the historic mi­
gration of authority over the sector from judiciary to executive, and 
the failure of the sector - perhaps particularly its philanthropic com­
ponent - to evolve effective means and structures of self-regulation 
and accountability. Silber's volume gives us the historical background 
to these contemporary struggles in ways that resonate clearly as de­
bates on discretion, oversight, and authority over the nonprofit sector 
continue to emerge. 
Five analytical and policy approaches to these problems of over­
sight and accountability in the nonprofit sector have had some promi­
nence. Oversight through the Internal Revenue . Service remains 
problematic for any role except the direct tax consequences of non­
profit activity - and even inconsistent in that arena as well.69 The po­
tential for state-level charity commissions has been bruited since 
Karst's well-known article, but adherence to that approach has faded 
over the years as the complications of organizing .charity commissions 
has become evident, and the issues in the English model have become 
more clear. A third approach, press exposure of the failings of the 
nonprofit sector, is a useful supplementary tool to strengthen account­
ability. But press reporting on nonprofit failings tends to focus more 
on the outrageous cases than on structural or widespread problems, 
and, except in scandalous cases, tends to be short-lived.70 
Given the weaknesses of these approaches, two others are on the 
rise. One relies on nonprofits themselves, not primarily on the over­
sight power of the states or the federal government, or the role of the 
press. Increasingly the nonprofit community is paying attention to 
strengthening self-regulation within its own arena. The nascent self­
regulatory efforts underway include strengthening of the roles and ca­
pacities of nonprofit boards, enhancement of internal regulatory stan­
dards (including codes of conduct, standards, and principles), nascent 
attempts at formalizing accreditation of nonprofits in specific geo­
graphic areas or functional areas of work, improving the regulatory ef-
69. A recent General Accounting Office report reiterates this point. See U.S. GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IMPROVEMENTS POSSIBLE IN 
PUBLIC, IRS, AND STATE OVERSIGHT OF CHARmES, GAO 02-526 (Apr. 2002); Harry 
Lipman, IRS Oversight Lacking, Draft Report Says, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 2, 
2002, at 36. 
70. I am indebted to my colleague Sandy Boyd for discussion of this point. As Joel 
Fleishman has noted: 
[A]lmost invariably, the press presents a picture badly out of focus, one that is unnecessarily 
alarming to the public, and even worse, that frequently undermines the public's confidence 
in the possibility of effective action. The result . . .  is to create an atmosphere of hysteria 
which can sometimes lead to throwing out the baby with the bath. 
Fleishman, quoted in Robert Bothwell, Trends in Self-Regulation and Transparency of Non­
profit Organizations in the U. S., INT'L J. NONPROFIT L. (Sept. 2001), at 
www.icnl.org/journaUjournal.htm. 
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forts of non-governmental "watchdog" organizations, and strength­
ening organizational disclosure and transparency.71 
Some of these efforts rely on government regulatory impetus, such 
as public disclosure requirements for nonprofit tax documents. Most 
rely on nascent and conflictual attempts to try to build a sort of inter­
nal law for the nonprofit sector, oµe that both helps govern the arena 
and protect it from external criticism and additional oversight. Self­
regulation has become something of a watchword in the nonprofit 
community, both in the United States and abroad. Finding ways of ef­
fectively implementing self-regulatory structures has, however, long 
been a problem for the nonprofit sector, and despite the active and 
committed efforts to strengthen self-regulation in recent years serious 
questions remain as to whether the current focus on self-regulation 
can be effectively substantiated. 
The last of the prominent analytical approaches to nonprofit over­
sight and regulation is the new state activism discussed in this Review, 
typified - at least in New York - by the aggressive intervention of 
the New York Attorney General in the Wallace-Reader's Digest and 
New York Community Trust matters. Activist state authorities have 
advantages in the oversight and regulation of the nonprofit sector, an 
arena traditionally regulated at the state level, as the Silber volume 
discusses, and still governed in great measure by state law. The close­
ness of state authorities to local nonprofit activities, and the powers 
already available in state law, would seem to make state officials a 
natural source of increased nonprofit oversight. 
But a renewed state activism in nonprofit oversight, whether exer­
cised formally or informally, has real potential disadvantages as well. 
When state authority is used informally - as in Wallace-Reader's 
Digest � it can have beneficial consequences in individual cases, but 
remains unevaluated by judges and holds the potential for over­
reaching. And judges have rebelled against certain aspects of the new 
state activism, as in the New York courts' refusal to require notice by 
community foundations to the Attorney General upon exercise of the 
variance power. Moreover, activism in one or several states threatens 
to magnify the already highly inconsistent nature of state oversight, as 
many state attorneys general or secretaries of state have neither the 
interest nor the resources for a more active approach. Perhaps most 
important, a new state activism in oversight of the nonprofit sector 
71. This typology relies on the excellent work of Robert Bothwell. See Bothwell, supra 
note 70. Other very useful recent work in this area includes Joel Fleishman, Public Trust in 
Not-for-Profit Organizations and the Need for Regulatory Reform, in PHILANTHROPY AND 
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN A CHANGING AMERICA (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehr­
lich eds., 1999), and Peter Swords, Nonprofit Accountability: The Sector's Response to Gov­
ernment Regulation, Norman A. Sugarman Memorial Lecture, Mandel Ctr. for Nonprofit 
Organizations, Case Western Reserve University, Mar. 16, 1999, available at 
www.qual990.org/np_account.html. 
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holds distinct potential for direct politicization of the Attorney 
General's role, the likelihood if not the certainty of heightened state 
scrutiny of specific nonprofits - or nonprofits representing specific 
groups - when politics, as well as oversight and legal principles, may 
demand it. 
Despite these real problems, a new state activism in oversight of 
the nonprofit sector appears likely to remain a force in coming years. 
In fact, it may be that both of these latter approaches - a new state 
activism in nonprofit oversight and increased attention to self­
regulatory structures - will have continuing impact on the nonprofit 
sector. Each affects primarily the post-chartering world of nonprofit 
operations, not primarily the establishment or chartering stage itself. 
In that sense, these new, or renewed, approaches stem from a histori­
cal process in which state-level oversight of nonprofits has shifted 
from a strong state discretionary role in chartering to a more limited 
chartering role, with decades of exploration of alternative paths to 
oversight and regulation of nonprofits and charities already in opera­
tion. If strong discretionary state chartering is no longer acceptable as 
a normative proposition, then post-chartering oversight and regulation 
through some means, or some combination of means, must become 
more effective. The new state activism, though fraught with problems, 
shows one of the possible ways forward. 
